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Few finaricial accounting reporting problems have 
received as much attention as the translation of the 
foreign financial statements of U.S. owned investees. At 
a time when there were very few standards at all, 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 (ARB No. 43) [AICPA, 
1953] devoted a chapter to a survey of methods of 
accounting for and disclosing foreign operations and for 
translation of foreign financial statements. The 
recommendations of ARB No. 43 were only slightly modified 
by Accounting Principl~s Board (APB) Opinion No. 6 in 1965 
[AICPA, 1965]. A wide range of methods was still 
considered acceptable. An exposure draft of a proposed 
APB Opinion, "Translating Foreign Operations," was issued 
in 1971 but was never finalized. 
Political problems and a declining acceptance caused 
the demise of the APB in 1972. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) inherited the problem of accounting 
for and reporting international. operations; economic 
conditions in the United States forced the FASB to give 
prompt attention to the problem. The U.S. dollar had been 
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allowed to float for the first time since the 1945 Bretton 
Woods Conference. The dollar was rapidly declining 
against most other currencies as a result of many years of 
artificially high exchange rates. In the United States, 
unemployment, inflation, and an unfavorable trade balance 
were directing public and political attention to the 
activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Severe 
economic sanctions were imposed, and others were proposed. 
The FASB made foreign currency translation the first 
item on its agenda and issued a temporizing statement, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 1 
"Disclosure of Foreign Currency Translation Information," 
(Statement No. 1) in 1973 to standardize reporting until 
it could study the question in more depth. This statement 
essentially endorsed the multiple methods permitted under 
APB Opinion No. 6. In 1975, Statement No. 8, "Accounting 
for the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and 
Foreign Currency Financial Statements," replaced Statement 
No. 1. Statement No. 8 required a single method, the 
temporal ~ethod, for translating financial statements; it 
also required immediate recognition of translation gains 
and losses. Accountants, corporate representatives, and 
the financial press immediately protested and denounced 
the requirements of Statement No. 8 as misleading to 
statement users and costly td firms. 
lobbied for another change. 
These parties 
It is not clear whether the FASB yielded to pressure 
or was persuaded that Statement No. 8 had caused severe 
economic consequences to firms and investors. However, 
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the board issued a new standard in 1981, Statement No. 52, 
"Foreign Currency Translation." Reversing its previous 
stand, the FASB changed the method of translation to the 
current rat~ method and required the deferral of 
translation gains and losses through special adjustments 
directly to stockholders' equity, for those firms 
designating the foreign currency as the functional 
currency. Evans and Doupnik [1986] found that most firms 
elected to apply the current rate method except where they 
were precluded from doing so because investees were 
operating in highly inflationary economies. 
Statement of the Research Question 
The standards for foreign currency translation have 
no tax effects and no direct cash flow effects, but many 
affected firms and individuals complained loudly that 
Statement No. 8 caused adverse economic consequences. 
Holthausen and Leftwich [1983] state, "Accounting choices 
have economic consequences if changes in the rules used to 
calculate accounting numbers alter the distribution of 
firms' cash flows, or the wealth of parties who use those 
numbers for contracting or decision making." There are 
many reasons why a basically cosmetic accounting change 
may produce decisions by managements that ultimately 
change production or investment decisions and therefore 
cash flows. 
The very act of lobbying against an accounting 
standard causes a change in cash flows because the time 
and effort expended on the action is costly. This alone 
would probably be insufficient to have a significant 
economic impact. But, if management takes actions to 
influence reported numbers, those actions may have very 
significant effects on actual cash flows. If investors, 
correctly or incorrectly, anticipate changes in 
managements' behavior, their expectations will be 
reflected in the firms' share prices in an efficient 
market. 
Empirical research in the area of economic 
consequences of changes in accounting standards has been 
largely confined to analyses of the impact on the prices 
of firms' common stock: Leftwich [1981] argued that it 
should be beneficial to extend tests to nonprice data, to 
evidence of choices made or actions taken in response to 
changes in the acco~nting environment. He cited as an 
example the allegation that some companies undertook 
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currency hedging in response to Statement No. 8. Leftwich 
believed that if this allegation is true, it suggests an 
economic consequence of accounting numbers of large 
magnitude. 
Attempts to detect changes in share prices caused by 
the temporal method of translating foreign currency 
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statements under Statement No. 8 have yielded inconsistent 
results. Studies attempting to associate specific firm 
characteristics or changes in management behavior with a 
decision to lobby against Statement No. 8 have led to 
little more than the conclusion that firms that lobby tend 
to be large compared to firms that do not lobby. 
points are discussed more fully in Chapter II. 
These 
There are two important shortcomings in many studies 
of economic consequences of accounting standards. One is 
that the linkage between an event and a consequence is 
often overlooked. Statement No. 8, by itself, should not 
have caused a share price reaction. However, it may have 
caused actions by managements which led to a market price 
reaction. A second shortcoming is in treating accounting 
changes as if they occur in a vacuum. There may be 
contemporaneous conditions which create both the need for 
an accounting standard and the belief that parties have 
been adversely affected by that standard. The advent of 
floating exchange rates, increased inflation, and high 
interest rates are examples of such conditions which it 
appears may not have been given appropriate consideration 
in the foreign currency translation literature. 
The purpose of this research was to test for two 
specific management actions in response to Statement No. 8 
and Statement No. 52 that could alter firms' cash flows: 
(1) a change in the proportion of foreign currency 
denominated long term debt to total long term debt and (2) 
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a change in the proportion of short term debt to total 
debt for firms subject to these standards. These two 
changes were selected because surveys of affected firms 
indicated that these were specific changes that were made 
in response to Statement No. 8 to avoid accounting 
exposure to translation losses [Business International 
Corporation, 1982; Evans, Folks, and Jilling, 1978; Shank, 
Dillard, and Murdock, 1979]. The change in denomination 
of debt, indicated by some of these firms, was a 
substantial decrease in the use of foreign currency 
denominated debt. The change in term of debt was to allow 
more flexibility in managing accounting exposure. An 
increase in current liabilities would also result from 
increased hedging activities. Statement No. 8 would also 
encourage the use of less long term debt relative to short 
term debt because under the temporal method all debt was 
subject to translation exposure; whereas under certain 
previously acceptable methods, only current liabilities 
were exposed. Even when the previously used accounting 
method resulted in translation exposure for all 
liabilities, the practice of amortizing translation gains 
and losses over the life of the long term obligation 
ameliorated the effect on accounting income [Shank, 
Dillard, and Murdock, 1979]. The environmental economic 
events which also may have been causal factors--floating 
exchange rates, inflation, and interest rates--are 
controlled for in this study. 
This study was concerned with overall, marketwide 
effects. The policy of the FASB is that accounting 
standards should be neutral. Neutral in this case does 
not imply a lack of effect, but rather that there are no 
predetermined adverse effects for those firms which are 
subject to the standard. Time series and cross sectional 
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accounting data were pooled to estimate parameters for the 
population of firms subj~ct to the provisions of Statement 
No. 8 and 2£. Random coefficients regression (RCR) was 
used. RCR, described more fully in the research design 
section, provides efficient estimates of population 
parameters from pooled data. This method is considered an 
appropriate method for detecting overall changes in a 
population from pooled, observational, time series, and 
cross sectional data [Dielman, 1980; Easton, 1987; Judge, 
et al., 1982; Swamy, 1971]. 
The next two sections of this paper review some of 
the more significant research on the economic consequences 
of Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 52 as well as on some 
other accounting changes and describe the theoretical 
framework for this research. The remaining sections 
describe the data and methodology for the study, the 
results of the study, a discussion of the results and 
the~r implications, and future research indicated by this 
study. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Motivation for Economic 
Consequences Literature 
Several events in the 1970's led to the development 
and refinement of theories underlying economic 
consequences of accounting standards and to attempts to 
identify and measure those consequences. The literature 
in this area has come to be more frequently referred to as 
positive accounting theory literature. From the time of 
its establishment, the FASB concentrated on establishing a 
Conceptual Framework which would help determine future 
accounting standards. Conscious of the problems which led 
to the failure of the Accounting Principles Board, it 
structured the standard setting process to develop 
standards which could be supported by a basic underlying 
theory of accounting. Public hearings are solicited 
during the development stage of a proposed standard and 
open hearings are held before the final issuance of new 
standards. Because there was no formal procedure to 
evaluate, ex post, the consequences of the standards, in 
1978 the FASB called for research on the effects of the 
standards which it had issued to that date and held the 
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first conference to consider the results of that research. 
Since that time it has continued to encourage and 
commission such studies. 
While the FASB was working to establish its 
credibility as a standard setter by establishing a theory 
of accounting, a substantial body of literature emerged 
which stressed that political and economic pressures 
determined accounting standards rather than any normative 
theory. Watts and Zimmerman [1979], for instance, held 
that government regulation creates incenttves for 
individuals to lobby on proposed accounting procerlures, 
and accounting theories are useful justifications in the 
political lobbying. They propose that if lobbying is not 
successful, agency costs may be incurred to renegotiate 
contracts and refinance debt. With the presence of 
government regulation there is even greater motivation to 
incur costs as a result of certain accounting standards. 
Watts, Zimmerman, and others established, if there had 
previously been any doubt, that new or changed accounting 
standards are costly. Researchers attempted to 
characterize firms which incurred costs and to identify 
and measure those costs. 
The development of the efficient market hypothesis 
and the capital asset pricing model in the finance 
literature allowed accounting researchers to identify 
abnormal returns, or economic consequences, of financial 
events. Thus the demand for an accounting theory, 
political pressures, emerging financial theory and the 
availability of data bases and computers generated the 
economic consequences or positive theory literature. 
General Economic Consequences Research 
General Price Level Adjustment 
10 
Watts and Zimmerman [1978] hypothesized that 
"managers have greater incentives to choose accounting 
standards which report lower earnings (thereby increasing 
cash flows, firm value, and their welfare) due to tax, 
political, and regulatory considerations than to choose 
accounting standards which report higher earnings and, 
thereby increase their incentive compensation" when the 
firm is regulated or is subject to political pressure. 
They used regression and discriminant analysis to study 
the lobbying practices of firms commenting on the FASB's 
proposed General Price Level Adjustment and found that the 
single most important factor explaining managerial support 
for this standard, which would reduce reported income, was 
firm size. The authors interpreted firm size to represent 
sensitivity to political costs. They predicted that firms 
would manage reported earnings and alter investment/ 
production decisions if they believed the costs of 
government interference would be large. Even if 
management compensation is temporarily reduced by an 
accounting standard which reduces reported income, the 
authors believe this will be adjusted for promptly because 
such adjustments are in the best interest of both owners 
and management. 
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The findings of Watts and Zimmerman are relevant to 
subsequent economic effects studies in that they predict 
that political cost factors will outweigh contracting cost 
factors for large firms. Firms will negotiate new 
contracts and alter investment activities in response to 
changes in standards. 
Successful Efforts Accounting in the Oil 
and Gas Industry 
Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal (1981] examined the 
"economic reasons for the negative abnormal common stock 
performance of firms whose reported earnings and 
stockholders' equity were negatively affected by the 
proposed elimination of full cost accounting in the oil 
and gas industry." Statement No. 19 eliminated the use of 
the full cost method of accounting and required all firms 
to use the successful efforts method to account for 
exploration costs. This significantly reduced reported 
income for the firms studied and also increased the 
volatility of reported earnings. The authors considered 
four explicit theories to explain the negative effects of 
the proposed statement reported in earlier market tests 
performed by Collins and Dent [1979] and Lev [1979] 
Collins, et al, used cross sectional multiple 
regressions to test whether the abnormal returns resulted 
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from naive investor, modified naive investor, contracting 
cost, or estimation risk theory. Their results indicated 
something more than naive investor theory was at work. 
Naive theories imply that if earnings per share decline, 
even though cash flows do not, either investors will 
discount the share price in the market or management acts 
as if some investors will do so. Contracting cost theory, 
explained more fully in the next chapter, states that 
accounting methods are chosen as part of a wealth 
maximizing process. A new mandatory statement restricts 
the investment/financing/accounting method mix which would 
maximize shareholder wealth. The new mix reduces expected 
cash flows by increasing information costs, causing firms 
to seek new capital suppliers and to incur bonding and 
monitoring costs. Estimation risk arises when investors 
become less certain of the firm's cash flows because of 
income volatility or because they are uncertain of 
management's reaction to a change. 
expect a higher rate of return. 
Investors therefore 
Total capital, or size, was used as a comprehensive 
proxy for leverage, public debt, political costs, and 
omitted factors. Collins, et al, predicted all but 
political costs should have a negative sign but that 
political costs would yield a positive relationship. Size 
and leverage were both found to be significant in this 
study but the researchers could not determine whether the 
contracting cost or estimation risk theory best explained 
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the negative abnormal returns because of their use of size 
to proxy for so many variables. They conclude that their 
research, and the research of others, clearly establish 
that the elimination or change of accounting choices may 
affect investment/financing decisions apd create a loss or 
transfer of wealth among the providers of firm capital. 
A Review of Economic Consequences 
Literature 
Holthousen and Leftwich [1983] reviewed the economic 
consequences literature prior to 1983 and concluded, as 
did Collins and Dent, that size and leverage affect 
choices of accounting techniques. Accounting changes 
appear to have economic consequences but there is no 
theory yet to make these predictions. They also suggested 
that since new or changed accounting standards are usually 
politically and economically motivated, most of the 
studies are flawed by the omission of environmental 
variables and the failure to observe what specific 
investment/financing changes are made. 
Recently Watts and Zimmerman [1990] reviewed the 
research in what they call positive accounting theory and 
concluded that the most important result of this research 
was the discovery of certain empirical regularities in 
firms' choices of accounting methods and other firm 
variables, such as leverage and size. They found that 
there are still serious problems in research methodology 
and that researchers must improve the linkage between 
theory and empirical tests. 
Patterns of Research in Foreign 
Currency Translation 
14 
Prior research on the economic consequences of 
accounting changes with respect to foreign currency 
translation can be classified into three basic groups: 
capital market studies of stock price responses to the 
announcement of a proposed change or to the actual change 
in an accounting standard, tests to discern 
characteristics of the firms which lobbied for 
modification to the requirements of Statement No. 8, and 
surveys which asked managers of affected firms about 
changes made in investment and financing activities as a 
result of standards changes. 
Stock Prices as Direct Evidence of 
Economic Consequences of Mandatory 
Standards for Accountin~ for Forei~n 
Currency Translation 
Makin [1978] investigated the share price performance 
of three groups of firms: multinationals (MNEs), matched 
pairs of domestic firms, and self-selected "sensitive" 
firms. These latter firms had either lobbied against 
Statement No. 8 or had stated publicly that they would be 
adversely affected by the standard. Five time periods, 
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before and after various exposure drafts and the issuance 
of Statement No. 8, from the years 1970 through 1977 were 
examined to capture separately the effects of floating 
exchange rates and accounting standard changes. The 
results of this study suggested that the application of 
Statement No. 8 produced little effect on share prices of 
MNEs in general, but had a negative effect on the so 
called sensitive group and this effect was greater for 
large firms than for small. 
In a study financed by the FASB, Dukes [1978] 
examined the price behavior of shares of U.S. MNEs at 
several dates preceding and subsequent to the issuance of 
Statement No. 8. He did not control for environmental 
conditions such as inflation and exchange rates. Dukes 
found no significant changes in either share prices or 
variability of returns for his sample of MNEs, as a result 
of applying Statement No. 8, although he found the returns 
of MNEs in general were lower than the returns of a 
matched group of domestic firms. He found no statistical 
difference between the returns of large and small firms. 
In a capital market study financed by the Financial 
Executives Institute, Shank, Dillard, and Murdock [1979] 
found no change in perceived risk from Statement No. 8. 
They found that the market reacted negatively to 
multinational firms in general during the time period 
studied and that this reaction applied to firms already 
accounting for foreign operations by the temporal method 
as well as to those that were required to change. Their 
study does indicate changes in management policies which 
are discussed later. They expressed the belief that the 
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FASB should perhaps reconsider Statement No. 8 because it 
may not reflect ,the complexity of foreign accounting 
problems, however, reconsideration on the basis of 
managerial impact was not indicated. 
Using a modif~cation of the usual market model, 
Zieb~rt and Kim [1987] standardized the average cumulative 
abnormal returns and used several shorter--than those used 
by the two previous research studies--test periods around 
Statements No. 8 and 2£. The shorter test periods and 
standardization of returns were considered more powerful 
in detecting what the researchers expected to be fairly 
small effects. In contrast with earlier findings, they 
found statistically significant negative returns for firms 
required to change their measuring method by Statement No. 
~ but not for those having to change from deferred to 
direct writeoff of gains and losses. They also found 
positive returns for firms in general associated with the 
solicitation by the FASB of comments regarding a change to 
Statement No. 8 and with the issuance of the exposure 
draft for Statement No. 52. 
Salatka [1989] used ordinary least squares and 
weighted least squares regressions on a control group, 
early adopters, and late adopters'of Statement No. 8 to 
test for negative excess returns as an indication of stock 
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price changes in the two experimental groups. His 
findings indicated that price changes had occurred in both 
experimental groups. He concluded that share price 
changes for early adopters resulted from changes in 
production, investment, and/or financing choices in 
response to impending contractual and political 
constraints, while the price changes for late adopters 
were probably more directly attributable to contractual 
constraints and political costs. Salatka felt that 
further research was needed to explore the differences 
between early and late adopters in specific production, 
investment, and financing activities. He cautioned that 
he did not control for exch~nge rate changes or inflation 
and that the stock price changes which he observed may 
have resulted from economic events which have no direct 
connection with Statement No. 8. 
It has been shown in a simulation study that the 
temporal method required in Statement No. 8 increased 
volatility of reported income [Rupp, 1982]. A recent 
survey of security analysts [Griffin and Castanias, 1987] 
also found support for a widely held belief that Statement 
No. 8 caused increased earnings volatility. One might 
anticipate that this increased volatility would 
consistently result in decreased returns. However, only 
the studies by Ziebart and Kim and by Salatka confirm the 
anticipated effect. It therefore appears that the results 
of the capital market studies are either inconclusive or 
that effects are relatively small, and may be detectable 
only with improved statistical techniques. Further, it 
appears important that future tests consider the 
possibility that the observed price changes may be the 
result of factors other than the change in accounting 
method. 
Characteristics of Firms Lobbying 
Against Statement No. 8 
Kelly [1982] tested whether firms that lobbied for 
changes from Statement No. 8 also made changes in 
financing or operating activities. No change was 
detected. Then an analysis was made to predict (1) 
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lobbying for changes to Statement No. 8, (2) a change in 
financing or operating activities, or (3) either lobbying 
behavior or a change in financing or operating activities. 
The predictions were based on (1) the existence of an 
incentive contract, (2) leverage, (3) size, (4) percentage 
of management ownership, and (5) the ratio of foreign 
assets to total consolidated assets. Only size was found 
to be significant in changing operating and financing 
activities. All of the independent variables except 
foreign assets were significant for either lobbying 
against Statement No. 8 or for changing financing or 
operating activities. Only size and low management 
ownership explained lobbying by itself. Kelly suggested 
that this revealed managements' risk aversion in the face 
of increased income volatility and the dominance of 
political costs behind decisions to change financing or 
operating activities. 
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In an extension of her 1982 study, Kelly [1984] used 
a contracting theory perspective to examine the influence 
of management's wealth on the decision to lobby against 
Statement No. 8. This research focused on the role of 
debt covenants and management's proportional ownership of 
the firm. It controlled for firm size and the magnitude 
of the potential effect; this was not done in the prior 
study. Size and foreign sales, proxying for political 
visibility, were the only significant variables in the 
decision to lobby because of implementation difficulties. 
Neither the existence of incentive contracts nor the 
degree of leverage was statistically significant. 
Lobbyers opposed to the income effect were characterized 
by large size and foreign sales percentage. This study 
partially confirmed her earlier [1982] findings, but 
controlling for size reduced the" significance of all of 
the other predictor variables. 
Discriminant analysis was used by Griffin [1983] to 
classify firms by whether or not comment letters were 
submitted on either Statement No. 8 or 2£. Discriminants 
were the ratio of long term debt to equity, market value 
of the firm, sales to assets, return, earnings available 
for common stock, amount of foreign currency adjustment to 
net income before taxes, and market beta coefficients. 
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Griffin found, as Kelly did, that firms that lobbied were 
large. He assumed size to be a proxy for political 
visibility. Tests of significance for the discriminant 
function coefficients were not made because there was no 
reason to assume equal covariance matrices or normal 
distribution for the independent variables. 
Gray [1984] classified large multinational firms by 
whether they used Statement No. 8 or Statement No. 52 in 
1981 and whether the method used in that year increased or 
decreased reported income. She found, contrary to Watts 
and Zimmerman [1978], that the majority of the firms in 
her sample chose the accounting standard which increased 
reported income. 
The preceding study was criticized by Ayers [1986a]. 
She examined subsequent financial statements and found so 
many cases of immaterial effects and revisions of earlier 
estimates of the increase in reported income that she felt 
nothing could be determined about the motivation for 
adopting Statement No. 8 or Statement No. 52 in 1981, as 
examined by Gray. Ayers [1986b] also studied the 
characteristics of firms and the year in which they 
adopted Statement No. 52. She concluded that the firms 
which chose early adoption were smaller, had a decrease in 
earnings in the year of adoption, had lower levels of 
management ownership, and had debt with greater 
constraints on dividends. These conclusions conflict with 
Gray's findings [1984] but support the conclusions of 
other research--firms choose the accounting method which 
minimizes reported income or results in less variability 
of income. 
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These lobbying characterization studies lead to one 
consistent conclusion: firms that lobbied with respect to 
Statement No. 8 tended to be very large but did not appear 
to have any other statistically significant, common 
characteristics. The statistical techniques used in the 
cited studies were unable to reliably predict lobbying 
behavior or managerial actions. These issues are 
considered in the methodology section of this paper. 
Surveys of Consequences of Statements 
No. 8 and 52 
Shank, Dillard, and Murdock [1979], mentioned 
earlier, also included an extensive survey of financial 
management policies in. their study. Respondents indicated 
that at least 48 percent were either increasing or 
decreasing the level of dollar debt to foreign currency 
debt in financing for~ign operations and offsetting asset 
or liability exposure under Statement No. 8. Most of the 
firms indicated they were, or they believed they were, 
spending more to manage foreign exchange risk exposure 
after Statement No. 8. Eighty four percent indicated that 
they hedged to smooth the bottom line. 
In a survey similar to the preceding one, Evans, 
Folks, and Jilling [1978] attempted to discover (1) if 
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management tried to avoid increased volatility of reported 
earnings by increased or new foreign exchange risk 
management practices and (2) the estimated costs and 
benefits of those practices. Most surveyed firms 
indicated that significant additional resources were 
expended. They also expressed a belief that Statement No. 
~ requirements provided misleading information to 
statement users. Management emphasized that the costs of 
protection against rate changes were buried in operating 
costs whereas translation and exchange gains and losses 
were highly visible. Many of these firms indicated a 
shift from a long to a short or even position in foreign 
currencies. These firms reported that they often engaged 
in costly hedges to avoid a translation loss, but not a 
translation gain. Another significant finding from this 
study and from one performed by Morsicato [1980], was that 
in most firms, the foreign exchange risk management and 
decisions regarding the denomination of debt are centrally 
controlled. This suggests that if management decisions 
are altered by the accounting standards for translation, 
the results of actions taken to neutralize the income 
statement effects of an accounting standard should be of a 
larger magnitude because of centralized decision making. 
If separate policies were established by the local 
managers of decentralized subsidiaries, the diverse local 
financing activities might cancel out some of the effects. 
In contrast to the studies cited above, a survey by 
Business International Corporation [1982] predicted even 
greater changes in risk management practices and costs 
under Statement No. 52 than were claimed under Statement 
No. 8. Accounting exposure under Statement No. 8 was 
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limited to the difference between assets translated at the 
current rate and debt, whereas under Statement No. 52, the 
entire net investment is exposed. 
Summary of the Literature Reviewed 
The literature on direct effects on security prices 
from a change in accounting standards yielded inconsistent 
results. Attempts to characterize firms that opposed 
Statement No. 8 indicated that firms that lobbied tended 
to be very large. Kelly's [1982] study suggested that 
some of these large firms that lobbied may also have 
changed operating and financing activities. The surveys 
of financial management policies indicated that certain 
firms believed that Statement No. 8 caused them to change 
the amount of hedging and the term and denomination of 
debt. 
Surveys tell what firms say they do and not 
necessarily what they actually do or why they do it. In 
the literature reviewed, only the surveys attempted to 
define specific actions undertaken as a result of 
Statements No. 8 and 2£ that would affect cash flows. 
There appears to be a need to identify specific actions, 
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if such exist, in order to determine if generally adverse 
economic consequences resulted from applying Statement No. 
~. 
Changing economic conditions since 1972--
specifically, exchange rates, inflation, and interest 
rates--may have affected firms' exchange risk management 
practices, rather than changes in accounting standards. 
These conditions should be considered if one is to infer 
economic implications from changes in accounting 
standards. 
The following section describes the concept of costly 
contracting and monitoring which may link changes in 
accounting standards with changes in cash flows. This 
section is followed by a description of the methodology 
for a study performed to test for two specific changes in 
financial management under changing economic conditions 
and accounting standards. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Costly Contracting and Monitoring 
A theory of economic consequences of accounting 
choice has developed from agency theory under a concept of 
costly contracting and monitoring. Under agency theory, 
an agent/manager is risk averse and seeks to maximize his 
own wealth. Such maximization may not maximize the value 
of the firm. When an accounting standard is changed, 
management will seek to protect its wealth. The action 
taken by management may change the cash flows of the firm. 
The economic consequences result from the following causal 
links between firms' cash flows and reported earnings 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983]: 
1. management compensation plans, 
2. government regulations, 
3. lending agreements, and 
4. political visibility 
Management Compensation Plans 
These plans often allow management to share profits 
in excess of a target level which is frequently based on 
accounting income or on a rate of return on some valuation 
of the firm. Statement No. 8 increased income volatility 
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and therefore increased uncertainty with respect to 
management compensation. Under maximization of personal 
wealth, management is expected to incur lobbying costs in 
an attempt to try to have the standard changed. In the 
event the standard cannot be changed, management would 
seek to reduce the variability of income by changing 
investment and financing decisions and engage in costly 
negotiation in order to change compensation plans. Kelly 
[1984] did not find the existence of incentive 
compensation plans to be a significant characteristic of 
firms lobbying against Statement No. 8. 
Government Regulations 
Governmental and regulatory bodies may restrict 
activities of some firms based on accounting numbers. 
While regulation primarily affects utilities and similar 
firms, it could also induce regulation of prices or the 
imposition of tariffs for oil, airlines and shipping, or 
for other goods involved in international trade. When 
accounting numbers change, additional costs may be 
incurred to lobby politicians to avoid changes in costs or 
revenues. This link is closely related to that of 
political visibility. 
Lending Agreements 
Debt covenants based on accounting numbers may place 
restrictions on a firm. Increased volatility of income 
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under Statement No. 8 could place a firm in violation of 
certain of these covenants, restricting its ability to pay 
dividends and to borrow or forcing costly redemption and 
refinancing. Kelly [1984] and Griffin [1983] did not find 
the proportion of long term debt to equity to be a 
significant characteristic in firms lobbying against 
Statement No. 8. 
Political Visibility 
For politically visible firms, changes in accounting 
numbers may increase the probability of additional taxes 
being imposed or privileges being restricted. This 
linkage is especially important in considering the 
reaction to Statement No. 8. In the past the U.S. 
Government has imposed excess profits taxes on large oil 
companies, restricted the amount and source of direct 
foreign investment, imposed withholding taxes on 
repatriated earnings, cancelled tax treaties, and 
Other restricted or placed tariffs on imported goods. 
governments also have restricted operations and 
confiscated assets when the actions of foreign firms were 
held to have adverse effects on their country's economies 
or political policies. There is no costly contract to 
renegotiate in this case but costs are incurred to educate 
politicians so that undesired legislation will not be 
enacted and to lobby standard setting bodies to change the 
accounting standard. If the standard cannot be changed, 
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additional costs may be incurred to avoid the resultant 
taxes or restrictions or to neutralize the standard. In 
most economic consequence studies, size is assumed to be a 
surrogate for political visibility. 
The No Effects Theory 
If capital markets are efficient, an accounting 
standard which has no effect on cash flows should have no 
effect on market returns. But, accounting standards will 
have economic consequences if contracting and monitoring 
are costly or if management acts as if they are costly. 
Management may believe that markets are inefficient and 
that statement users cannot properly interpret accounting 
numbers changed by reporting standards [Burns, 1976]. 
Even if managers themselves believe in market efficiency 
of some form, they may perceive that as individuals, 
certain investors, directors, officers, or others do not 
believe in efficient markets; or, they may be rewarded or 
penalized based on accounting numbers. Consequently, 
managers may make changes in operating and financing 
activities to neutralize the effects of a change in 
accounting standards. 
Based on contracting and monitoring theory, 
management, especially in large firms, is expected to 
incur costs to lobby to change a standard that causes 
income volatility. If the standard is not changed, or 
until it is changed, management will make financing and 
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investment decisions in an attempt to neutralize the 
effects of the standard. In the case of the temporal 
method of translating under Statement No. 8, some of those 
decisions might involve a change in the denomination of 
debt or a commitment to more flexible and more expensive 
short term debt. 
The next chapter describes a test for evidence of (l) 
a change in the proportion of foreign currency denominated 
debt and (2) a change in the proportion of short term debt 
to total debt, for firms affected by mandatory accounting 
standards for translation of foreign financial statements. 
Political visibility represented by size, financing 
activities which might smooth reported income, and the 
changing conditions in the economic environment are 




Long Term Debt 
Companies claimed that because of the accounting 
exposure caused by Statement No. 8, they used less foreign 
currency denominated long term debt. They may have 
retired such debt early, or replaced it with more costly 
U.S. dollar denominated debt. Since foreign operations of 
U.S. MNEs expanded rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
absolute amount might be expected to increase. But the 
increase, if any, may have been at a lower rate than would 
otherwise be expected because of the accounting 
restrictions of Statement No. 8. Alternatively, the 
proportion of foreign currency denominated debt may have 
actually declined. The adoption of Statement No. 52 
elimi~ated the recognition of translation gains or losses 
in net income. If firms truly reduced their foreign debt 
under Statement No.' 8, this restriction should be 
eliminated with the adoption of Statement No. 52 in either 
1981 or 1982. The hypothesis to test for a reduction in 
foreign currency long term debt under Statement No. 8 is: 
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Firms affected by Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 
2£ made no change in the proportion of foreign 
currency denominated long term debt to total long 
term debt after implementing Statement No. 52. 
Short Term Debt 
Firms also claimed that Statement No. 8 caused them 
to use more costly short term debt because it allowed them 
more flexibility in reducing accbunting exposure to 
exchange rate fluctuations. An examination of the notes 
to the financial statements of several large MNEs in this 
study indicated that nearly all such firms used multiple 
currency revolving credit arrangements. The terms of 
thes~ arrangements allowed firms to borrow and repay 
easily and change the currency in which a loan is 
denominated. Most of the revolving loan agreements were 
for periods of up to seven years. These agreements 
allowed the borrowers some freedom in classifying debt as 
short term or long term. 
exposed asset positions. 
It also allowed firms to hedge 
The following hypothesis is 
stated to test for increased reliance on more costly short 
term debt during the period in which Statement No. 8 was 
in effect. 
Firms affected by Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 
2£ made no change in the proportion of short term 





The sample of companies used for this study was taken 
from "International 150 U.S. Companies Ranked by Foreign 
Sales" [Business Week, 1986]. The sample firms were 
limited to large companies for the reasons which follow. 
Research discussed in Chapter II indicated that the single 
most significant characteristic of firms that lobbied for 
a change from Statement No. 8 was size. Second, if 
managements of large firms take actions to neutralize the 
impact of a change of accounting method, the resulting 
effects should be both absolutely and relatively greater 
for large firms than for small firms. Third, smaller 
firms are less dependent on public debt and may therefore 
be less concerned with an accounting change that is 
basically cosmetic. Finally, Vernon [1977] found that at 
least 80 percent of all foreign direct investment, at that 
time, was controlled by fewer than 70 firms and that more 
than 90 percent was controlled by the 150 largest U.S. 
MNEs. Assuming similar conditions persist, the activities 
of the pool of 150 companies may represent 90 percent of 
the activities that were purportedly affected by the 
change in accounting standards. 
The population from which the sample was selected 
reported gross foreign sales totalling $414.9 billion in 
1985. The largest firm reported foreign sales of $62.75 
billion. The smallest amount of foreign sales reported by 
any firm was $431 million. Any firm not included in the 
I 
population from which the sample was selected would have 
had foreign sales of less than the $431 million reported 
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by this smallest firm. Each smaller firm's foreign sales 
would represent less than 0.104 percentage of the combined 
foreign sales of the 150 firms that made up the sample 
population and a much smaller p~rcent of the foreign sales 
by all U.S. companies. Therefore, although many small 
firms were not subject to selection for the test sample 
this should not appreciably affect the findings of the 
study. 
The 150 companies were assigned numbers and an 
original sample of 50 companies was selected on a random 
basis. Companies were eliminated if: 
1. acquisitions or business combinations made results 
noncomparable for the period 1975-1985; 
2. information for the relevant time period was not 
available in Disclosure or in Moody's Industrial 
Manual, Transportation Manual, or Bank and Finance 
Manual; or 
3. the notes to the company's financial statements 
indicated that only the temporal method was used for 
translating the financial statements of its foreign 
affiliates subsequent to the adoption of Statement 
No. 52. 
As a company was eliminated from the sample because 
of the three criteria explained above, another company was 
randomly selected to replace it. Eighteen of the original 
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sample of fifty companies were eliminated. Another 
fourteen were eliminated, or a total of thirty-two, before 
fifty companies were found which met the selection 
criteria. The final sample had foreign sales totalling 
$219.7 billion, or 52.95 percent of the $414.9 billion 
international sales reported by the 150 largest companies. 
The sample firms are listed in Appendix A; the remaining 
one hundred firms are listed in Appendix B. 
Regression Equations 
The equations used to test the two research 
hypotheses are: 
H0 1: FCLTD 
TLTD 










Bo + B1 (FAS) + Bz (INT) + B3 (MERM) 
Bo + B1 (FAS) + Bz (INT) + B3 (MERM) 
foreign currency denominated long term 
debt 
total long term debt 
short term debt (i.e., short term notes 
payable and advances) 
total debt (i.e., short term debt + long 
term debt) 
a dummy variable, 0 or 1, for pre- or 
pos~- adoption of Statement No. 52 
interest rate for year 
strength of the U.S. dollar represented by 
the Multilateral Exchange Rate Model 
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Foreign Currency Long Term Debt 
Foreign currency long term debt (FCLTD) was obtained 
by studying the notes to the financial statements and 
terms of the debt covenants where such detail was 
available. Only those long term borrowings which were 
denominated in specific foreign currencies and required 
settlement in those specific foreign currencies were 
included. In many cases the funds borrowed were 
denominated in foreign currencies but the principal and 
interest were fixed in terms of U.S. dollars. In other 
cases principal and interest were denominated in the 
foreign currency but the debt was fully hedged through 
exact parallel loans in that currency. These amounts, as 
well as Eurodollar loans, were excluded from FCLTD. 
FCLTD was translated at the current rate, as required 
under both Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 52. While 
the translation method is consistent over the time period 
involved, the amount of the dependent variable, FCLTD, 
would change simply because of a change in the spot rate 
between the U.S. dollar and the foreign currency in which 
the debt is denominated. In order to avoid indexing each 
exchange rate and re-translating every individual loan, a 
variable representing the strength of the U.S. dollar 
relative to other major currencies is included in 
the regression model to control for the cross temporal 
fluctuation of exchange rates. 
Total Long Term Debt 
Total long term debt (TLTD) is the consolidated 
balance sheet classification, long term liabilities, 
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excluding long term lease obligations. 
in TLTD. 
FCLTD is included 
Short Term Debt 
Short term debt (STD) is primarily a balance sheet 
classification. Current lease obligations are omitted, 
but it does include the currently maturing portion of long 
term debt. Notes to the financial statements indicate 
that most companies with extensive foreign operations 
purchase the right to lines of credit in multiple 
currencies with numerous institutions. Many of the firms 
disclosed the effective interest rates for such loans, 
which was frequently in excess of 25 or 30 percent. 
Dummy Variable - FAS 
The data used in this study covers the years 1975 
through 1986. Statement No. 8 was adopted in 1975 and was 
in effect until 1981 for early adopters of Statement No. 
2£ or 1982 for those who were late adopters. Some firms, 
with year ends other than December 31, did not apply the 
standard until years ending in 1983. It is the sign and 




The U.S. short term Treasury Bill rate (INT) is used 
to control for the effects of interest rates on financing 
decisions. Interest rates are shown in Table I, below. 
Nominal interest rates are a combination of the real rate 
of interest and anticipated inflation. The real rate of 
interest is believed to have increased until mid-1984, to 
its highest level in this century. The decline in nominal 
rates, which appears in 1982 is attributed to the sharp 
decline in actual and anticipated inflation [United States 
Government Printing Office, 1987]. 
TABLE I 






































The amount and term of debt, without regard to 
denomination, are influenced by interest rates. During 
periods of high interest a company may defer borrowing new 
funds or borrow for a shorter term, expecting to replace 
the debt later when terms are considered more favorable. 
The denomination of debt may depend to some extent on 
the difference in interest rates between countries. 
However, in general equilibrium theory interest rate 
parity suggests that the real interest rate is constant 
across currencies and that nominal interest rates reflect 
inflationary expectations in a specific currency 
[Rodriguez, 1984]. INT therefore represents both the 
changing real cost of money and the expected inflation in 
the United States. 
Exchange Rates 
The Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM) is 
included in the regression to control for the strength of 
the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. MERM, shown 
in Table II on the following page, is calculated by the 
International Monetary Fund and represents the strength of 
the U.S. dollar relative to other major trading 
currencies. MERM is a complex weighted average using 
exchange rates, trade volumes and cash flows of 20 major 
trading nations and has been calculated with only minor 
adjustments since 1970. 
TABLE II 






































Other measures of relative strength of currencies are 
available but these have been subjected to more revision 
over time [Rodriguez, 1984]. Prior to 1970 most 
currencies were pegged to the dollar. When currencies 
were allowed to float and the gold standard was abandoned, 
the dollar declined rather sharply in value until 1980. 
Purchasing power parity implies that the same market 
basket of goods purchased with different currencies should 
cost the same regardless of currency. If this were true 
it should not be necessary to include a variable for 
monetary strength once currencies were allowed to float; 
however, monetary policy, political conditions, tax laws, 
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technology, demand, trade balances and many other factors 
all cause purchasing power parity not to hold at least in 
the short run. All of these factors probably influence a 
firm's decision with respect to the source and terms of 
debt. 
It has been suggested [Hakkio, 1986] that the 
relationship between interest rates and exchange rates, 
underwent a structural change during the period involved 
in this study. Hakkio studied the relationship between 
interest rates and exchange rates for short segments of 
the years 1974 through 1985. He suggests that the two 
rates should move together but that during the 1970s the 
dollar and U.S. interest rates were dominated by inflation 
shocks and that during the 1980s changes in real interest 
rates were the dominant influence on interest rates and 
the dollar. Hakkio's findings were based on comparisons 
of interest rates and exchange rates at the same point in 
time and at intervals of two to four years. A study of 
the entire time period, however does not support his 
conclusions. At the same point in time there was little 
correlation between the two variables but there was a very 
high positive correlation (.70) between nominal interest 
rates at time t-3 and nominal exchange rates at time t. 
This could imply that when U.S. ,interest rates are high, 
demand for dollar investments increases and drives up the 
strength of the dollar over time, that is, that 
equilibrium occurs over time. It may further suggest that 
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the two are really quite different. That is, exchange 
rates may only represent current costs while interest 
rates represent longer run realities in the real interest 
rate plus inflationary expectations. 
Interest rates and exchange rates should have an 
effect on a firm's choice of debt term and denomination. 
Both rates are included in the model used in this study 
to control for their impact on financing decisions which 
may have been attributed mistakenly to the change in 
accounting standards. 
The Regression Model 
The econometrics literature suggests at least eight 
techniques for analyzing pooled cross sectional and time 
series data. Dielman [1980] has developed guidelines 
which were used for selection of the most appropriate 
method. On Dielman's decision tree-- Figure 1 on the 
following page--the path chosen from point A depends on 
the objective of the analysis. If answers about 
individual subjects are desired, the correct path leads to 
point B. For the purposes of this study the overall 
effects of the change from Statement No. 8 to 2£ are 
desired. This leads to point C in the decision tree. 
If it can be assumed that all subjects react in the 
same manner, all data can be pooled and ordinary least 
squares regression may be used to estimate the 
coefficients for the model with a single error term due to 
Error P 
componen s 
Q Classical pooling or aggregation 
}-----' 
Intercepts Intercepts are Separate regressions 


















Some random & some 
fixed coefficients 
L N RCR 
L-----1 Coefficients 
are all random 
Coefficients Intercepts Not interested 
are the same E differ .--G-. in intercepts QJI B 1-------------j~l 1------~Do-1 _. Error 
...____,.._--' 
Individual components Coefficients 
differ 
Intercepts 
are the same intercept 
estimates 
Classical pooling F 
or aggregation ANCOVA H 
Figure 1. Decision Tree for Regression Models 
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sampling variation--point Q on the decision tree. This is 
not a realistic assumption in this instance because firm's 
responses will differ depending on managements' attitudes 
toward the standards for translation, the conditions in 
the different countries in which their investments are 
situated, and their prior exposure to foreign exchange 
risk. 
A modification of this aggregation technique makes 
the assumption that while coefficients for the independent 
variables are the same across subjects, there is a 
difference due to an inherent difference in the subjects. 
In financial data this difference might be an industry 
effect. In this case the basic aggregation model may be 
modified to: 
where: [ -~1 if firm i is otherwise in industry 1 
This model can be restated as Y = (a + c W) + b X + e 
which simply shifts the intercept for industry effects but 
still assumes a constant slope for the regression lines. 
It also requires the estimation of an additional parameter 
for each industry or cross sectional unit, leaving fewer 
degrees of freedom for tests of significance. 
Maddala [1977] states that the coefficients of the 
dummy variables for each industry or cross sectional unit 
are not interpretable because there is no specification of 
the nature of the variable which cause the regression line 
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to shift. He terms this a "specific ignorance" which may 
as well be treated the same as our other "general 
ignorance" which is e, the error term. In this event c 
would be a normally distributed random variable with mean 
zero and an unknown variance. This variation of the model 
is the error components model--P on the decision tree. 
Both the aggregation and error components models 
assume the slope of the linear regression, or the 
coefficients of the independent variables, are unchanging 
over cross sectional data. This is not a reasonable 
assumption in the present study. Intercepts will differ 
because of firm size, prior financing activities, and 
individual and industry risk. The coefficients for the 
independent variables are expected to differ between 
individual firms for several reasons. Some firms may be 
more (or less) flexible in their ability or desire to 
alter financing arrangements because of pre-existing long 
term debt covenants, exchange restrictions, credit rating, 
and company policy. This causes a move to decision box J 
on Dielman's decision tree. 
Dielman states that no statistical test is known to 
assist in making a decision between Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR) and Random Coefficients Regression (RCR) 
at point J. If SUR is chosen, separate regressions are 
performed for each firm. An unspecified averaging 
technique must then be selected to determine the pooled 
coefficient estimates and to test to see if the means of 
the individual equation coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. Separate regressions analysis also 
requires the estimation of a great many parameters, 
leaving fewer degrees of freedom for tests of 
significance. Separate regressions analysis is not 
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considered a particularly fruitful approach by Dielman and 
he suggests that random coefficients regression (RCR) 
offers a better method for analysis. The nature of the 
subjects and data in this study indicates that RCR is the 
most appropriate analysis method. 
RCR treats all coefficients as random variables, 
allowing variation in both the intercept and slope 
coefficients. Using each time period and each cross 
sectional firm as a sample in estimating the parameters of 
the population greatly expands the base of the data and 
allows the researcher to make inferences about the 
population means and variances. RCR is considered 
especially useful in studying the impact of policy 
variables where the policy is considered to enter into 
decision making rather than having a strictly additive 
effect. [Maddala, 1977] 
The procedure used is based on Swamy's [1971] model 
as described by Maddala [1977]. The program was written 
using Time Series Processor Version 4.1B at TSP 
International, Palo Alto, California. 
are performed. 
Four basic steps 
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1. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
computed for each of N = 50 cross sectional firms 
overT= 12 time periods. 
i 
j 
1,2, ... ,N 
1, 2, ... , T 
2. Generalized least squares (GLS) is used to 




3. Weights are computed for pooling the group 
coefficients: 
N 
L: {1/[6' 2 + a//(XJ'XJ)]} 
j =1 
These weights are inversely proportional to the 
variances of the OLS estimates. 
4. The population parameters in steps two and three 
above are estimated by GLS; OLS estimators would 
be consistent but not efficient because the 
variance is not constant. Since u 2 , the variance 
of the error; and 6' 2 , the variance of E1 are not 
known, they are estimated by using preliminary 
consistent estimators from the OLS equations in 
step one above. 
A 1. A A a2 
T ui'u1 
A l.L; A (1. 
1\ 
02 Ei 2 - L; Ei )2 N N 
T statistics are provided by the analysis to test for 
significance of coefficients. In this analysis the 
significance of the coefficient on the dummy variable 
indicates the strength of the relationship between the 
change in the ratio of foreign currency denominated debt to 
total long term and the ratio of short term debt to 
total debt with the change in the accounting standard. 
The variance of this coefficient indicates the variation 
from firm to firm. 
Chapter V describes the results of the tests which 
were performed. The implications of the test results, a 
critique of the study, and some suggestions for future 
research are discussed in the final Chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Ordinary Least Squares Results 
In the first step of the analysis process, OLS 
regressions were found for each of the individual 
companies to obtain preliminary estimators for use in the 
RCR analysis. As explained in Chapter IV, the results of 
the OLS regressions are unbiased but they are not 
efficient because of the autocorrelation of errors in time 
series data. Table III, on the following page, summarizes 
the signs of the coefficients for the dummy variable, FAS, 
and the number of statistically significant results for 
the individual company regressions. 
A positive coefficient was expected for FAS in the 
test for FCLTD/TLTD., If companies were averse to using 
foreign currency denominated long term debt simply because 
of the reporting requirements of Statement No. 8, an 
increase in the ratio of FCLTD to LTD would be expected 
after the firm changed to Statement No. 52. As evidenced 
by Table III, approximately one half of the sample firms 
have' positive coefficients for FAS and half have negative 
coefficients. This may be partially attributable to the 
inefficiency of OLS estimators in time series data. 
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TABLE III 
RESULTS OF THE OLS REGRESSIONS 
OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES 
Sign of Coeffi-



































A negative coefficient was anticipated for the ratio 
of STD to TD. If firms used more and costlier short term 
debt to control accounting exposure while Statement No. 8 
was in effect, the relief from recognizing translation 
gains and losses provided by Statement No. 52 should have 
resulted in a reduction of the use of short term 
borrowing. Again, it is apparent from Table III that 
there was no discernable difference in the sign of the 
coefficient and that very few of the regression 
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coefficients were statistically significant. Appendix C 
lists the companies for which the coefficient for FAS was 
statistically significant and their rank by size among the 
150 companies from which they were selected. 
As part of the estimating process for RCR an overall 
OLS pooling of the data was performed for both FCLTD/TLTD 
and STD/TD. The results of these OLS regressions are 
summarized in Table IV, on the following page. OLS 
provides inefficient estimators and over estimates t 
statistics in the presence of high positive 
autocorrelation. The results for both FCLTD/TLTD and 
STD/TD clearly indicate the model and/or the method is not 
appropriate for analysis due to the high autocorrelation 
in the error terms. 
The next step in the RCR estimation consists of a 
generalized least squares conversion of the OLS variance 
covariance matrix to arrive at the final RCR estimates. 
TABLE IV 
POOLED OLS ESTIMATES 

























STD/TD Bo + B1 FAS + B2 INT + B3 MERM 
Standard 
Parameter Estimate Error 
Constant 0.35989 0.11494 
FAS 0.01089 0.03154 
INT 0.00154 0.00339 
MERM -0.00071 0.00097 
R-square 0.0018 
1st order autocorrelation 0.771 
***significant at 0.01 
** significant at 0.05 

















Random Coefficients Regressions Results 
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The initial OLS estimators, discussed above, were the 
first step in the RCR estimation. They were used to 
complete the RCR estimates summarized in Table V on the 
following page. 
TABLE V 
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
FCLTD/TLTD Bo + Bl FAS + B2 INT 
Standard 
Parameter Estimate Error 
Constant 0.18190 0.06752 
FAS 0.00440 0.01834 
INT -0.00487 0.00266 
MERM -0.00009 0.00045 
STD/TD Bo + Bl FAS + B2 INT + B3 
Standard 
Parameter Estimate Error 

































***significant at 0.01 
** significant at 0.05 
* significant at 0.10 
The null hypothesis for Hl, firms affected by 
Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 52 made no change in the 
proportion of foreign currency denominated long term debt 
to total long term debt after implementing Statement No. 
i£, cannot be rejected as a result of this study. The 
sign of the coefficient for FAS is positive as expected 
but the t statistic is not statistically significant. 
Only the constant and the coefficient for INT are 
statistically significant in the regression equation. The 
failure to reject the null hypothesis means that no 
significant linear relationship FAS and the ratio 
FCLTD/TLTD was observed in this study. 
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The null hypothesis for H2, firms affected by 
Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 52 made no change in the 
proportion of short term debt to total debt after 
implementing Statement No. 52, also cannot be rejected. 
The sign of the coefficient is negative as was anticipated 
but it also is not statistically significant. 
In the following section a brief summary is 
presented. A discussion of the implications of the study, 
its limitations, and suggestions for future research then 
conclude this work. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Summary of the Study 
Many firms lobbied for relief from the reporting 
requirements of Statement No. 8. Surveys reported that 
firms often made financing decisions to avoid the 
accounting exposure imposed by that standard. Among those 
decisions which they claimed were costly were the choice 
to use less foreign currency denominated debt and the 
choice to use more short term debt, to allow more 
flexibility in hedging accounting exposure. A few studies 
cited in Chapter II reported finding negative abnormal 
returns for firms affected by Statement No. 8, implying 
that the cash flows of such firms were affected. 
If financing or other changes are made, such changes 
are costly and they affect future cash flows. Thus, 
mandatory accounting changes may indirectly affect cash 
flows. Costly financing changes would justify attributing 
negative abnormal returns to the mandatory accounting 
standard. If these financing or other changes do not 
occur, then any observed negative abnormal returns may be 




Tests for changes in the use of foreign currency 
denominated debt with respect to total long term debt and 
for changes in the use of short term debt with respect to 
total debt under Statement No. 8 and Statement No. 52 were 
performed using Random Coefficients Regression. Although 
the signs of the coefficient for FAS were positive for 
FCLTD/TLTD and negative for STD/TD as expected, no 
statistically significant effect was observed for either 
relationship. 
Implications of the Results 
Failure to reject the null hypotheses of no change 
does not necessarily mean that no changes occurred. The 
power of the tests may have been too low to detect the 
change. Both a visual observation of the data and the 
individual companies' OLS iesults indicate that some 
companies did change their debt ratios after the adoption 
period for Statement No. 52, 1980 through 1983. 
The economic environment of the test period makes it 
difficult to measure change and detect the causes of 
change. Interest rates and exchange rates were extremely 
volatile throughout the twelve year, period studied. These 
factors made operating in any environment, especially an 
international one, difficult. This volatility in the 
economy may have caused management to believe that it was 
the accounting standard which made financing decisions 
more difficult or made their financial statements 
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misleading and to lobby for change. And, it may also have 
caused them to attribute some of their financing decisions 
to the accounting standard rather than to the economic 
conditions of that time. 
Previous studies have not attempted to control for 
economic variables. In cases where changes in abnormal 
returns were observed and attributed to the change in 
standard [Salatka, 1989; Ziebart and Kim, 1987], the 
researchers conceded that the observed change may also 
have been the result of omitted economic variables. In 
the present case, where some of these economic variables 
were controlled, it is possible that changes occurred but 
were confounded by extreme contemporaneous economic 
changes. 
It may also be that a semi-strong efficient market 
was more concerned with how sharply rising interest rates 
would affect future cash flows than with what a cosmetic 
change in an accounting standard would do to cash flows. 
This would explain the negative abnormal returns found by 
Dukes [1978] for all multinational firms, even those that 
had used the requirements of Standard No. 8 prior to its 
mandatory adoption by all firms. Multinational firms 
would have had these same concerns about rising interest 
rates. In this study the coefficient for INT was negative 
and highly significant in the OLS test for FCLTD/TLTD and 
negative and significant at 0.10 in the RCR analysis. 
This significance is not directly interpretable because of 
the use of a ratio for the dependent variable, but INT 
does appear to have some relationship to FCLTD/TLTD. 
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If firms had a foreign net liability position while 
Statement No. 8 was in effect, translation gains would 
have been reflected in their financial statements for 1976 
and 1977, and losses for 1978 through 1980. Under 
political cost theory as described in Chapter III and as 
has been established in several empirical studies (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990], large firms prefer accounting 
methods which smooth or minimize income and lobby for such 
standards even though lobbying is costly. Managers also 
choose those contracts which either maximize all parties' 
wealth or their own wealth. They would probably not 
select a term or denomination of debt which is not optimal 
just to avoid recognizing a gain or loss in the financial 
statements as long as other contracts, such as bonus plans 
and debt covenants, can be renegotiated. 
If the null hypotheses are correct, this would be of 
importance to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
the Securities Exchange Commission and other special 
oversight groups charged with the responsibility for 
establishing accounting standards. Policy formulation is 
highly political. Corporate managers and large accounting 
firms have been successful in dictating standards in their 
own self interest over the years. In cases such as the 
investment tax credit, successful efforts accounting, 
price level adjusted financial statements, consolidated 
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financial statements, and translation of foreign financial 
statements these policy making bodies have had to retract 
or alter pronouncements to suit the demands of lobbyers 
and the legislature. If many of the lobbyers' claims 
could be rejected as false, policy making bodies would be 
less subject to preparer dominance. 
In summary, no statistically significant change was 
detected in either FCLTD/TLTD or STD/TD as a result of 
the mandatory change in accounting standards. This does 
not establish the null hypothesis that no change occurred, 
even though there are several explanations from 
contracting cost and political cost theory which suggest 
the null hypothesis may indeed be correct. 
Contributions 
This study contributes to the understanding of the 
economic consequences of accounting changes. Two 
financing changes which firms claimed they had made in 
response to Statement No. 8 were not confirmed. This 
finding suggests that the difficult economic conditions 
which necessitated the change in standard may have led 
firms to the actions which they attributed to the change 
in standard. 
This study used a statistical test which is 
relatively new to accounting research. RCR has had some 
use in marketing and finance research, but it could have 
many more applications in accounting events studies. The 
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limited usage to date is probably because RCR is not 
readily available in commercial regression programs and it 
requires a considerable amount of programming. When RCR 
does become available it should have many applications in 
accounting research because of its ability to process 
autocorrelated data. 
Limitations 
The failure to obtain significant results in the 
study cannot be assumed to mean that the financing changes 
tested for did not actually occur. The nature of 
accounting data makes it difficult to use in quasi-
experimental studies. Accounting data are by their nature 
autocorrelated. They are also subject to some degree of 
measurement error due to the use of estimates in accrual 
accounting and some freedom in accounting method choice. 
Only data from large public firms were used in the 
study. The reason for this was that these firms are the 
most subject to political costs and that they represent 
nearly all of the foreign investment and business 
conducted from the Unit~d States. However, it means that 
anything implied by this study should not be extended to 
small or nonpublic firms without further study. 
Issues for Future Research 
No similar research has appeared to either confirm or 
deny the results of this study. It may be useful to 
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replicate the test using other time-varying operations or 
non-linear models. These might yield more insight than 
did RCR. 
Another possibility is to restructure the hypotheses 
to test for no effect. A confirmed no effect finding 
would be useful to policy makers who are subjected to the 
political pressures of statement preparers and users. 
Studying the effects of accounting changes while 
considering the contemporaneous economic conditions was 
stressed in this project. These conditions may be the 
true cause of observed effects. It would extend knowledge 
of economic consequences if earlier tests were 
reconsidered in light of economic conditions. 
Conclusions 
Firm behavior and management actions cause economic 
This consequences, not mandatory accounting standards. 
examination of two changes in financing decisions 
attempted to link specific actions with the negative 
abnormal returns believed to have occurred as a result of 
a new mandatory accounting standard. The results failed 
to confirm those changes. If such changes were made, they 
were probably not extensive and were dependent upon the 
previous investment and financing policies of each 
individual firm. 
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Abbott Laboratories $ 950.0 28 % 
Deere 898.0 22 
Litton Industries 870.0 19 
Schering-Plough 803.4 42 
Ralston Purina 753.1 13 
Emhart 742.7 42 
Wang Laboratories 735.7 31 
Baker International 730.9 38 
Campbell Soup 716.1 18 
Allegheny International 703.6 34 
Sterling Drug 668.6 37 
Eaton 659.0 17 
Mat tel 571.9 54 
Polaroid 528.0 42 
Celanese 512.0 19 
Fruehauf 512.0 18 
Libbey- Owens-Ford 507.5 26 
B. F. Goodrich 493.4 15 
IC Industries 487.9 11 
Hercules 476.0 18 
Total $219,686.9 
APPENDIX B 
COMPANIES EXCLUDED FROM STUDY IN 
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Trans World Airlines $ 1,607.2 44 % 
Sperry 1,595.0 28 
Merck 1,588.6 45 
u.s. Steel 1,578.0 8 
Sara Lee 1,510.3 19 
Texas Instruments 1,418.0 29 
Caterpillar 1,403.0 21 
Halliburton 1,399.9 29 
H. J. Heinz 1,386.3 34 
W. R. Grace 1,320.0 25 
Me Dermott 1,250.4 39 
Control Data 1,178.8 23 
American Cyanamid 1,169.8 30 
Warner-Lambert 1,162.0 41 
HNG/Internorth 1,142.3 11 
Smithkline Beckman 1,054.5 31 
American Home Products 1,047.8 22 
Continental Corp. 1,031.4 20 
Pepsico 951.9 12 
PPG Industries 934.0 21 
American Standard 930.0 31 
Quaker Oats 926.9 28 
A&P 922.6 16 
Westinghouse 904.3 8 
Avon Products 887.9 36 
Murphy Oil 867.3 34 
Kellogg 855.2 29 
United Brands 852.9 26 
Borden 832.3 18 
Champion International 826.2 14 
Borg-Warner 800.1 20 
McDonald's 789.9 23 
CBI Industries 779.4 so 
Ingersoll-Rand 754.5 29 
RCA 742.8 8 
Flour 742.1 18 
NL Industries 737.7 47 
Squibb 728.7 36 
Texas Eastern 721.3 13 
AMP 710.1 43 
Continued 
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Dana $ 698.1 19 % 
Emerson Electric 698.0 15 
Castle & Cooke 690.0 35 
Black & Decker 684.8 40 
Rohm & Haas 667.0 33 
Diamond Shamrock 652.1 16 
Merrill Lynch 640.0 9 
Upjohn 633.0 32 
Armco 626.7 17 
Anderson Clayton 625.7 34 
Transworld 588.3 27 
Alcoa 580.3 11 
Baxter Travenol 576.0 24 
Owens-Illinois 566.1 15 
National Semiconductor 563.9 32 
CBS 554.3 12 
Engelhard 552.4 24 
Crown Cork & Seal 552.1 37 
Ocean Drilling 531.3 67 
American Family 525.0 55 
La farge 510.5 54 
Foster Wheeler 499.0 41 
Dun & Bradstreet 495.1 22 
K Mart 493.5 2 
Singer 483.6 20 
Norton 472.1 40 
Intel 471.5 35 
Raytheon 449.0 7 
Hughes Tool 446.2 35 
Lubrizol 431.0 47 
Total $195,670.8 
Note: The total of Appendix A and Appendix B is $415.4 
billion rather than $414.9 billion as shown in the 
Business Week source material. This discrepancy is 
assumed to be due to rounding. 
APPENDIX C 
COMPANIES WITH STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT 
COEFFICIENTS FOR FAS IN OLS REGRESSIONS 
FCLTD/TLTD 
Coeff. Rank In Rank in 
Sign Sam:gle 150 Cos. 
Baker International ** + 38 105 
Burroughs (Unisys) * 17 42 
Emhart ** 36 101 
Hercules ** + 50 145 
IC Industries ** + 49 143 
Mat tel * + 43 126 
3 M ** + 14 34 
Monsanto ** 18 47 
Philip Morris * + 9 19 
Ralston Purina ** + 35 99 
Union Carbide * 13 32 
Xerox ** + 10 21 
STD/TD 
Coeff. Rank In Rank in 
Sign Sam:gle 150 Cos. 
Allegheny International ** + 40 110 
Burroughs (Unisys) ** 17 42 
Campbell Soup * 39 108 
CPC International * + 16 38 
Dresser * + 27 72 
Eaton ** 42 117 
Firestone ** 28 73 
Gillette * 22 61 
Hercules ** 50 145 
Libbey-Owens-Ford ** + 47 138 
Eli Lilly ** 29 76 
3 M ** + 14 34 
Mobil ** 2 2 
* Significant at 0.10 
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